This paper examines empirically whether differences in legal competences of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) of European gas and electricity markets are rationally aligned to the corresponding countries' divergent levels of 1) security, 2) competitiveness, and 3) carbon-neutrality of energy supply. Scores are derived (a) on the extent to which these energy supply characteristics are realized and (b) on how many competences NRAs have regarding these policy objectives. Although higher energy scores should reduce the need for regulatory intervention and thus legal competences, it appears that this does not hold for most policy objectives. In fact, gas and electricity market unbundling and/or liberalization imply higher degrees of regulatory intervention. Finally, the legal competences do not completely follow the 'optimal' competence arrangement for regulatory authorities; compared to a theoretical benchmark there are relatively more 'tough' than 'soft' competences, while the latter are less costly to exercise. These potential regulatory 'mismatches' could be corrected by adjusting the number and intrusiveness of the NRAs' legal powers.
Introduction
This paper provides an empirical and comparative analysis of the legal competences of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) across the European Union (EU), including the extent to which those regulators have the power to intervene in contractual freedoms such as price setting, sales and investment decisions. By limiting the contractual freedom of firms, energy regulation restricts the property rights of gas and electricity companies. If the contracting restrictions are optimal, socially inefficient behavior by those energy firms is prevented so that competition and innovation are sustained. The aim is to test whether differences in legal competences of NRAs are significant and rational, in the sense that they are efficiently aligned to the public interest of a (1) secure, (2) competitive, and (3) carbonneutral energy supply. Such an empirical analysis could be the first step towards an efficiency assessment of energy governance arrangements across the EU. These insights may contribute to the European Commission's review of the regulatory framework, as stipulated among the action points of the Energy Union package (EC, 2015) .
The central research question is therefore: what are the main differences in the legal competences of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in the European gas and electricity markets, and are those differences rationally aligned to the countries' divergent levels of secure, competitive, and carbon-neutral energy supply?
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on the role of NRAs in energy regulation, and explains how the legal competences of NRAs are expected to respond to the security, competitiveness, and carbon-neutrality of energy supply. Section 3 discusses the research methodology, whereas section 4 presents the results and a discussion thereof. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature review
A two-part definition of regulation is provided in Den Hertog (2012) . The first part of the definition mentions "the employment of legal instruments for the implementation of socialeconomic policy objectives". From a law and economics point of view, gas and electricity market regulation restricts the contractual freedom that those energy firms have on their property rights. These restrictions should mainly be applied for those policy objectives related to improving the proper functioning of markets.
ii With regard to the energy market, the typical policy objectives or public interests at stake, according to the European Commission, are a (1) secure, (2) competitive, and (3) carbon-neutral energy supply.
iii The second part of the regulation definition in Den Hertog (2012) considers the enforcement aspect of such legal instruments: "individuals or organizations can be compelled by government to comply with prescribed behavior under penalty of sanctions." The enforcement of energy regulation has increasingly been allocated to National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), for example, in establishing "fines and penalties for non-compliance, [in acting] as arbiters in disputes between industry players, [or in protecting] end-users and [regulating] entry and exit through licences" (Battle and Ocaña, 2013) .
Given this delegation of legal competences from Ministries, much of the literature on NRAs focuses on the reasoning for and the extent to which NRAs are independent from the regulated industries and from political stakeholders (e.g. Gilardi, 2008) . Other NRA-related literature typically analyses their internal organizational structure (e.g. decision-making and external funding (Hanretty and Koop, 2012) ) or the energy sectors' market structure (e.g. Cambini and Franzi, 2013; Ugur, 2009) .
Less discussed and hardly analyzed are the legal competences or 'powers' of NRAs, and the extent to which these contribute to the energy supply objectives, which are essentially the two elements that make up the definition of regulation by Den Hertog (2012) . For instance, NRAs should "take all reasonable measures […] within the framework of their duties and powers to […] promote […] a competitive, secure, and environmentally sustainable internal market in electricity/natural gas within the [EU] " (Johnston and Block, 2012) .
iv Moreover, "in performing [the] tariff/methodology-setting function, [NRAs are to] ensure that transmission or distribution system operators are granted appropriate incentive, over both the long and short term, to increase efficiencies, foster market integration, and security of supply […] " (ibid) .
This paper fills a gap in the literature by analyzing the relationship between NRA competences and the realization of the three abovementioned objectives of a secure, competitive, and carbon-neutral energy supply.
v Hypothesized is that NRAs have fewer competences when those policy objectives are sufficiently met, since the realization of the objectives reduces the need for regulatory intervention.
The data on legal competences is deduced from questionnaires on gas and electricity market regulation gathered in 2011 and 2012 by the International Confederation of Energy Regulators (ICER).
vi , vii The 2011 electricity ICER survey has been analyzed before by Gianfreda and Vantaggiato (2013) . From most EU Member States plus several neighbouring countries, they investigate the enforcement powers of NRAs on electricity regulation and tariffs. Their main findings are that NRAs had diverse competences for transmission grids, and that the generation part of the value chain was lighter regulated than the retail part (i.e. it involved fewer competences). Moreover, Cambini and Franzi (2013) conducted surveys on competences of NRAs, but focused on Northern African and Middle Eastern countries. However, Gianfreda and Vantaggiato (2013) and Cambini and Franzi (2013) do not check whether the competences of NRAs are aligned with the countries' realization of energy supply objectives. Moreover, other researchers analyze NRA competences concerning other impacts (e.g. the centrality of NRAs in policy-making (Maggetti, 2009 )) or they analyze closely related policy objectives but apply different NRA aspects (e.g. NRA regulatory independence on connection charges (Edwards and Waverman, 2006). viii This paper further adds to the literature by empirically analyzing the distribution of NRA competence-types. To keep costs of both regulatory authorities and regulated firms contained (e.g. by ex-ante prescribing acceptable behavior instead of ex-post legal action) NRAs should follow the concept of 'responsive regulation' (e.g. Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) . Interventions are then differentiated according to the willingness of the regulated to comply, where the harshness of interventions is attuned with the severity of the violations at hand. In effect, and going from softer to tougher interventions, regulators dispose of the following three regulatory 'tools': 1) communicating and gathering information, 2) forming subsequent judgments, and 3) possible intervention.
ix We arrange the legal competences according to this 'responsive regulation' benchmark and, via this differentiation, we test the alignment of these competences to the various energy supply objectives.
Methodology
As mentioned above, the data on legal competences are deduced from 2011 and 2012 International Confederation of Energy Regulators (ICER) questionnaires on gas and electricity market regulation.
x In these questionnaires, (non-)EU Member States are asked whether they had legal competences over several categories, among others, whether they have the power to intervene in contractual freedoms such as price setting, sales and investment decisions -although it does not necessarily imply that NRAs have made use of these competences (see e.g. Voigt, 2012) . Rather than a cluster analysis in Gianfreda and Vantaggiato (2013) , the approach here is to label the questions according to their 'responsive regulation' competence-type (as identified from the ICER surveys on legal competences, and indexed with c): 1) inform, 2) assess, 3) approve, and 4) penalize.
xi Questionnaire replies with a "no" or "yes" were scored zero or one, respectively, upon which they were summed over the four competence-types.
xii,xiii Larger values thus point towards more legal competences in these categories.
[ Figure 1 : about here] Figure 1 illustrates our expectation on the four competence-types. Analogous to Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) , 'softer' competences are expected to be less costly to apply than 'tougher' competences, and therefore to receive lower shares in the overall NRA competence 'toolkit'. 'Tougher' competences are more costly to apply, for example, as pleas need to be prepared (see e.g. since they entail more extensive legal procedures than 'softer' competences do). Regarding the first research question (i.e. on the main differences in legal competences), the first hypothesis is therefore:
(H1). Most legal competences are allocated to the inform-category, and are subsequently allocated to the categories of assess, approve, and penalize, respectively.
The ICER-questionnaires have been conducted over two main sections. The first section contains subcategories analogous to the three policy objectives. The competence estimates herein will be used as response variables: 1) "security-of-supply" (sos csi ) for the security-of-supply competences 2) "consumer protection" (mkst csi ) and "energy efficiency" (enef csi ) as both partly explain competences on 'competitiveness' xiv , and 3) "renewables and environment" and "environmental regulation" relate to the electricity and gas sectors, respectively, where these sector-specific subcategories are merged for the carbon-neutrality competences (carb csi ).
Note that the subscript csi refers to the nesting of observations. The first level c = 1, …, 4 stands for the competence-types inform, assess, approve, and penalize, respectively; the second level s = 0, 1 refers for the electricity and gas sector, respectively; and the third level i = 1,…, 28 denotes the European country.
xv Expected is that priority is given to security-ofsupply as (industrialized) economies depend on a continuous energy consumption. It is not clear-cut which of the remaining two policies are second in line, or whether electricity or gas sectors differ regarding these priorities. The second hypothesis is therefore: (H2). Most legal competences are allocated to security-of-supply purposes.
The second ICER-questionnaire section contains NRA competences over the four elements of the energy value chain, namely: 1) generation (gener csi ), 2) transmission (transm csi ), 3) distribution (distr csi ), and 4) retail (retail csi ). They are brought together as follows:
As part of the covariates, it captures the difference in the number of competences within grids (transm csi and distr csi ) compared to non-grids (gener csi and retail csi ). xvi In liberalized energy markets, relatively more competences are allocated towards regulating transmission and distribution (i.e. grid csi is higher). This effect is expected to be less pronounced for the gas sector, however. Influential players outside national legal boundaries may benefit from markets which are liberalized. This especially holds for non-grid activity, as grid activity is locally bound. More non-grid competences are therefore necessary to prevent that outcomes deviate from national public interests (i.e. grid csi is lower).
It is not clear-cut, however, whether market liberalization increases the total number of competences. On the one hand, market liberalization leads governments to decrease their intervention in markets, resulting in fewer legal competences. On the other hand, market liberalization leads to more rules, as argued in Vogel (1996) , so that more legal competences may be needed (i.e. higher values for sos csi to carb csi ).
xvii By following the latter argument, the third hypothesis is therefore:
(H3). The number of policy area competences increases with more grid-related competences. This relationship is weaker for the gas sector.
The remaining independent variables contain the scores on the three energy supply objectives.
For the security-of-supply score (indexsos si ), we applied the countries' energy security rankings as available on the World Energy Council (WEC) website. The rankings were first min-max normalized. xviii The index is then the average of these normalized rankings. xix The scores thus range between 0 and 1, where higher scores point towards a better performance. xx For consistency purposes, the same steps are also taken for the other energy scores. As there are two 'competitiveness' competences (i.e. mkst csi and enef csi ), we also constructed two analogous energy scores. For the energy efficiency index (indexenef si ) a ratio is set up from Eurostat's Energy Balances items by subtracting 'consumption in energy sector' and 'distribution losses' from total energy output, and subsequently dividing it again by total energy output. Hence, the higher this ratio, the less energy is lost at generation and/or distribution, and the more efficient the energy system is.
xxii,xxiii
For consumer protection (i.e. mkst csi ) we created a market structure index (indexmkst si ) through the European Commission's internal energy market indicators on electricity and gas market structures (EC, 2012) . For the carbon-neutrality score (indexcarb si ), the energy-related carbon emissions per capita is selected for the electricity sector.
xxiv For the gas sector, the carbon emissions from the natural gas consumption and flaring are taken as a proportion of the total carbon emissions from the consumption of energy. Having defined the competences and the realization of energy policy objectives, the next hypothesis relates to the research question on their alignment. As NRAs should have fewer competences when policy objectives are sufficiently met, the hypothesis is therefore:
(H4). 
where, through a multilevel approach, the elements of the error terms (i.e. ε csi ) are tested for their significance: the random intercepts at competence (ζ 1c ), sector (ζ 1s ), and country-levels (ζ 1i ), and the covariates at competence (ζ 2c ,…,ζ 5c ), sector (ζ 2s ,…,ζ 5s ), and country-levels (ζ 2i ,…,ζ 5i ). xxvi Covariates at such nested levels are also called random coefficients. Moreover, the interaction terms in equations (2) to (5) allow us to determine whether impacts from the energy scores (i.e. indexsos si to indexcarb si ) change with different numbers of grid-related competences (i.e. grid csi ), and vice versa. Via these interactions we can test these combinations for their possible impacts on the number of NRA competences (i.e. sos csi to carb csi ).
Analogous to typical panel data techniques, this econometric approach accounts for repeated measurements and thereby allows getting closer to the causal effects.
xxvii It thereby addresses the issue of omitted-variable bias, where effects from the covariates on the response variables depend on (ceteris paribus) levels of one or more excluded variables. For example, if two NRAs have the same number of grid-competences but the Ministry from one NRA has more authority over the policy in question (i.e. an excluded variable) then estimation of the parameter is rendered inconsistent.
xxviii Multilevel effects may control for multiple withincluster effects and, thereby, account for such spurious effects as each cluster serves as its own control. Overall, instead of security-of-supply, most competences are allocated for carbonneutrality purposes, thereby rejecting the second hypothesis (H2). Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows that the majority of countries have a total number of security-of-supply (average: 5.11), consumer protection (average: 6.21), and carbon-neutrality (6.32) competences around and higher than the average, respectively. Only for energy efficiency do the majority of countries have less than the average number of competences (3.29). Figure 3 shows that overall more competences are allocated to the electricity sector, and that within the electricity sector most competences are allocated for security-of-supply and within the gas sector for carbon-neutrality purposes. Given the fewer gas competences generally and to security-of-supply specifically, Ministries may have decided not to confer these gas-sector competences to their NRAs as to better cope with influential gas suppliers outside their national legal boundaries.
Results and discussion

Descriptive statistics
Moreover, Figure 3 shows that inter-sector differences in scores mainly arise with regard to energy efficiency (i.e. enefindex si ).
xxx The higher score for the gas sector implies that this sector is on average more efficient in the transformation of energy than the electricity sector. Figure 4 further shows that most competences appear in the competence-category of inform, fewer for either assess or approve, and least for penalize. Overall, the ordering is hierarchic from inform to penalize, as expected from Hypothesis H1. Strictly speaking, though, only for consumer protection (mkst) this ordering is fully hierarchic. For energy efficiency, security-of-supply, and carbon-neutrality, NRAs need to be allocated more assess and/or fewer approve competences. These cases could thus serve as indications of under-or overregulation by NRAs.
[ Figure 5 : about here]
The upper part of Figure 5 shows the competences over the four elements of the energy value chain, namely: 1) generation (gener csi ), 2) transmission (transm csi ), 3) distribution (distr csi ), and 4) retail (retail csi ). The lower part of Figure 5 shows the transformation into grid csi . That the grid csi -bars are generally positive implies that most NRAs are allocated more competences for the grids. This result is in line with EU developments of grid unbundling whereby NRAs need to monitor and enforce the structural and behavioral rules for transmission (TSOs) and distribution system operators (DSOs). For example, operators controlling (transmission) grids in the gas and electricity value chains are prohibited from controlling generation and retail facilities, and vice versa. With multilevel regressions, the correlated nature of the hierarchical data can be taken into account. With multiple nests, the typical approach is to nest observations top-down: from country (level-3), to sector (level-2), and competence-level (level-1). As the aim of this research is to determine the relationship between competences and energy scores, we did not follow such hierarchy but selected all possible combinations of random intercepts (i.e. the nests) and random coefficients.
xxxv As in Hamilton (2013), we therefore applied likelihoodratio tests on full versus restricted models. For example, for random intercepts we tested the likelihood of a setup with (i.e. full) versus without level-2 nests (i.e. restricted). And for random coefficients, we applied setups without random coefficients (i.e. restricted) versus setups with one or several included (i.e. full). We further checked for the Poisson model's dispersion assumption (i.e. whether the expectation equals its variance). For this purpose, we selected 'negative binomial' models as Stata only supports these among multilevel models.
xxxvi,xxxvii
The last four columns of Table 6 show the final multilevel regression setups of the response variables. Several coefficients are not significant separately, but their interaction terms (e.g. grid csi with grid csi *index`p' si ) are jointly significant for most setups. The reported values of Table 6 are 'incidence rates', whereby coefficients below (above) 1.0 imply that the average rate impact is negative (positive) on the response variables.
xxxix With all intercepts and index`p' si coefficients below 1.0, a first inference is therefore that Hypothesis H4 holds, namely that the number of competences decreases (i.e. sos csi to carb csi ) with higher energy scores (i.e. index`p' si ). However, this relationship varies due to the interaction of index`p' si with grid-related competences (i.e. grid csi ).
xl,xli And besides coefficients (i) to (iii), the "fixed" effects, also the random effects (iv) to (viii) affect this relationship. Table 6 shows that the random intercepts (i.e. (iv) to (vi)) are significant at competence-level (ζ 1c ) for consumer protection, energy efficiency, and carbon-neutrality, and at country-level (ζ 1i ) for security-of-supply.
xlii The random coefficient of grid csi (i.e. (vii) and (viii)) is significant for energy efficiency (enef csi ) and carbon-neutrality (carb csi ).
xliii Determined as variances, these random intercepts and random coefficients indicate the (competence or country-specific) range around the 'true' average intercepts and grid csicoefficients, respectively.
[ Figures 7 and 8 show how these fixed and random factors align the average numbers of competences (i.e. the y-axis) with the energy scores and the grid-related competences. Figure  7 shows these averages as a function of the energy scores (index`p' si : on the x-axis) while the number of grid-related competences (grid) is held fixed at minimum, average, and maximum levels. Figure 8 does the opposite for index`p' si and grid. Figure 7 indicates that Hypothesis H3 holds, which conjectures a positive relationship between the number of NRA competences (i.e. sos csi to carb csi ) and grid-related competences (i.e. grid csi ). This finding thus provides backing for the 'more market, more rules' conjecture of Vogel (1996) , if the 'more market' aspect could be captured by the number of grid-related competences (i.e. market liberalization), and the 'more rules' could be captured by the number of policy area competences (i.e. sos csi to carb csi ). This effect especially holds for security-of-supply (sos) and consumer protection (mkst), as these lines become increasingly positive when moving from index(min) to index(max) -while the energy efficiency (enef) and carbon-neutrality (carb) lines level off.
Furthermore, Figure 8 indicates that Hypothesis H4 does not always hold; not for all policy areas are fewer competences conferred to NRAs (i.e. sos csi to carb csi ) when energy scores are higher (i.e. index`p' si ). As the impacts from carbon-neutrality changes sign (i.e. from grid(min) to grid(max)), which also is the case in Figure 7 , we infer that carbonneutrality (carb csi ) is a mixed bag. Its mixed results may relate to the overall separation of EU climate and energy policy. Although generally the largest, the energy sector is not the only contributor to carbon emissions. This may have led governments to delegate some competences to other climate policy-specific NRAs or Ministries. However, such shared responsibilities need to be accurately delineated so that, for example, NRAs can still sufficiently monitor "corporations that operate or have interests in different sectors and industries" (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2010) . Effectiveness may therefore improve if the sampled countries reconsider the regulatory scope of their NRAs. xliv Next of interest is why impacts on energy efficiency (enef) competences are opposite to those of security-of-supply (sos) and consumer protection (mkst). One distinguishing factor is that energy efficiency, despite its large potential in managing energy systems, has received relatively less attention in national and EU policies.
xlv Indeed, as shown in Section 4.1 above, fewest competences are allocated for energy efficiency purposes. A comparison with securityof-supply and consumer protection would therefore be on unequal terms. It is therefore the question whether the same outcomes would hold if NRAs were to be equipped with more energy efficiency competences (enef csi ).
In the development of EU energy law, especially security-of-supply (sos csi ) and consumer protection (mkst csi ) (i.e. competition policy) have interchangeably occupied center stage on the policy agenda (Johnston and Block, 2012) . It is reasonable to assume that firms will not voluntarily incur expenses in improving these two energy aspects (i.e. without their energy property rights being restricted). Energy efficiency improvements, conversely, reduce costs and may even result in energy demand increases (e.g. via the rebound effect). The positive relationships between legal competences and scores of security-of-supply (sos csi ) and consumer protection (mkst csi ) may therefore be driven by a regulatory 'lock-in' effect. Higher scores are then matched with stricter rules and enforcement. Rather than via the path of ever stricter regulations, policymakers should thus rearrange energy property rights such that it is in the firms' own interest to arrive at the (socially) optimal levels of security-of-supply and consumer protection.
[ Figure 9 : about here]
As mentioned above, the methodology allows zooming into the impacts as channeled via the multiple levels. The upper part of Figure 9 shows the random intercepts at country-level (ζ 1i ) for security-of-supply. No obvious pattern can be discerned, as a bit more countries have positive security-of-supply random intercepts (15) rather than negative ones (13). The lower part of Figure 9 shows the random intercepts at competence-level (ζ 1c ) (i.e. from inform to penalize) for consumer protection, energy efficiency, and carbon-neutrality. These follow the pattern as in Figure 4 and 5, namely that the intrusiveness of the intermediate assess and approve do not follow the 'optimal' hierarchic ordering. If assess and approve had more positive and negative impacts, respectively, NRA competences would have been hierarchic and, as a result, in accordance with Hypothesis H1.
[ Figure 10 : about here]
The other source channeling multilevel effects are random coefficients. Table 6 shows these are only significant with the grid-related competences (grid csi ) for energy efficiency (enef csi ) and carbon-neutrality (carb csi ). Figure 10 shows that, due to these random coefficients, the total effects from the grid-related competences (grid csi ) vary per competence-type (i.e. the random intercept). The strongest negative effects can be found with inform (i.e. smallest relative to the 1.0 incidence rate), and the weakest with assess. These results thus indicate that with more liberalization (i.e. more grid-related competences) there are fewer soft competences (i.e. inform).
Finally, the second part of Hypothesis H3 has not yet been discussed, namely whether impacts on the number of competences are weaker for the gas sector. While Figure 3 shows substantial gas versus electricity sector differences, effects at sector level were not significant or provided an inferior model fit. Competences at sector level are therefore not sufficiently pronounced for the hypothesis to be accepted or rejected regarding the gas sector.
Conclusion
This paper presented an EU-wide empirical study of energy market regulators and their legal powers. The following questions were posed: what are the main differences in the legal competences of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in European gas and electricity markets, and are those differences rationally aligned to the countries' divergent levels of (1) secure, (2) competitive, and (3) carbon-neutral energy supply?
From a variety of sources, we derived energy scores on the extent to which European countries have realized a (1) secure, (2) energy efficient, competitive and consumerprotective, as well as (3) carbon-neutral energy supply for their electricity and gas sectors. Based on surveys by the International Confederation of Energy Regulators (ICER), we developed estimates on NRA competences analogous to these energy supply properties, ranging from less intrusive ('soft') to more intrusive ('tough') competences.
Across NRAs, it appears that differences in the number of legal competences are large. Ministries have mainly conferred competences to NRAs for the electricity sector, primarily for carbon-neutrality purposes, but also for security-of-supply, consumer protection, and energy efficiency. NRAs are allocated more grid-related (i.e. transmission and distribution) than non-grid-related competences (i.e. generation and retail), which is in line with EU grid 'unbundling' developments.
Through a multilevel analysis we find that the alignment of NRA competences with their corresponding energy scores is not fully rational. First of all, although higher energy scores should reduce the need for regulatory intervention and thus legal competences, this inverse relationship does not hold for most policy objectives. Such 'mismatches' could point to under-or overregulation by energy regulators in the EU. For energy efficiency, energy scores and competences move oppositely as hypothesized, but definitive conclusions cannot be drawn since only few NRAs have competences in this policy area. For carbon-neutrality, energy scores and competences move both in similar and opposite directions. These mixed findings likely result from governments having delegated these competences to other climate policy-specific NRAs or Ministries. Effectiveness of regulations may therefore improve if the sampled countries reconsider the scope of their NRAs. Finally, for security-of-supply and consumer protection, energy scores and competences move in similar directions. These interactions may be driven by a regulatory 'lock-in' effect. Higher scores are then matched with stricter rules and enforcement.
In addition, we find evidence that NRAs with more grid-related competences, operating in more 'unbundled' and liberalized sectors, also have more of the above policy area competences. This finding supports the 'more market, more rules' proposition by (Vogel, 1996) .
Finally, the legal competences of NRAs do not follow the 'optimal' competence arrangement of regulatory authorities: compared to a theoretical benchmark there are relatively more 'tough' than 'soft' competences, while the latter are less costly to exercise. These potential regulatory 'mismatches' could be corrected by adjusting the number and intrusiveness of the NRAs' legal powers. The variables and their abbreviations are: 1) the number of security-ofsupply competences (sos), consumer protection (mkst), energy efficiency (enef), carbon-neutrality (carb), and grid-related competences (grid), and 2) the energy scores on security-of-supply (indexsos), market structure (indexmkst), energy efficiency (indexenef), and carbon-neutrality (indexcarb). The latter are abbreviated to index`p'. Figure 7 : Effects on the predicted mean of the number of legal competences (including fixed and random effects of sos to carb) from changing the grid-related competences (grid) while holding the corresponding energy score (i.e. indexsos to indexcarb) fixed. The variables are: 1) the number of competences in security-of-supply (sos), consumer protection (mkst), energy efficiency (enef), carbon-neutrality (carb), and grid-related competences (grid), and 2) the energy scores on security-of-supply (indexsos), market structure (indexmkst), energy efficiency (indexenef), and carbon-neutrality (indexcarb).
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where: Mean number of competences Figure 9 : Country-level random intercepts for security-of-supply (sos), and competence-level random intercepts for consumer protection (mkst), energy efficiency (enef), and carbon-neutrality (carb). i This research has been financed by the Energy Delta Gas Research (EDGaR) program. EDGaR is co-financed by the Northern Netherlands Provinces, the European Fund for Regional Development, the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation and the Province of Groningen. We wish to thank Oscar Couwenberg, Heinrich Winter, Francesca Pia Vantaggiato and the participants of the November 2014 GCEL research seminar for their comments and assistance. Any remaining errors are our own. ii Besides the typical market failures as natural monopolies and the continuity and availability of service, regulation should also further "distributional justice, rights protection, and citizenship -as, for example, […] regulated utilities are obliged […] to meet universal service obligations" (Baldwin et al., 2012) . iii The European Commission has increasingly adopted these as the main energy supply criteria. For example, in the Energy Roadmap 2050, "the Commission explores the challenges posed by delivering the EU's decarbonisation objective while at the same time ensuring security of energy supply and competitiveness" (EC, 2011) . iv Yet, it may not be excluded that their objectives are shared with other authorities. v In translating EU-wide goals into policies, the European Commission relied predominantly on Directives rather than Regulations. Partly, this is because energy has been among the main domains where EU Member States are reluctant to transferring their national sovereignty to the EU-level. In the Energy Package Directives, the minimum list of NRA duties and competences are stipulated. And, if compatible with EU law, Member States are allowed to go further than this minimum set of legal duties and competences, making inter-NRA differences likely. vi This data is available from: http://www.icer-regulators.net. 
, and x i and z i are country i's pre and post-normalization rankings, respectively. xix This approach follows that of Sovacool (2013) , upon which one of our security-of-supply indices is based (see the next footnote). We admit that, by virtue of this methodology choice, other techniques are skipped on how countries' policy performance can be tested for. One main branch concerns benchmarking, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (see e.g. Pompei (2013) specifically, or Zhou et al. (2008) generally). Yet, given its own flaws, benchmarking may not lead to an improved view on a country's relative performance (see e.g. Hirschauer and Musshof (2014) and Grifell-Tatjé and Kerstens (2008) ) which is needed in this analysis. xx For robustness purposes, we applied three security-of-supply indices. The (country-specific) index as mentioned in the text had the best model fit (AIC, BIC, log-likelihood, and the raw R 2 ). Information on the other two is available on request. xxi While the security-of-supply score is country-specific, the other scores only have the subscripts s and i, as data is only available at sector and country level, respectively. And unlike the response variables sos csi to carb csi , the policy scores lack the competence nesting (c), so it is more natural to take the scores as covariates. xxii In the Eurostat Energy Balances, the key energy input-output equation which needs to hold is: 'Gross inland consumption' + 'transformation output' + 'exchanges and transfers, returns' = 'final energy consumption' + 'final non-energy consumption' + 'transformation input' + 'consumption in energy sector' + For the correlation checks, we applied (standard) random effects panel regressions to test for the significance of these univariate combinations. For the mean specification checks, we obtained the Anscombe residuals, the standardized Pearson and squared deviance residuals and, via the 'mltcooksd'-package, the 'dfbeta' and Cook's D values. The mltcooksd-package "estimates Cook's D and dfbeta's for the second level units in two-level mixed models". This Stata ado-package is written by Dr. Katja Möhring and Dr. Alexander Schmidt, and is available via SSC. Standardization is performed via the hat matrix (see Hilbe, 2009, p. 275) .
Observations were detected as outliers if they exceed all of these critical values. From the regressions without these outliers we saved the (new) hat matrices, and included their higher order polynomials (2 nd to 4 th ). Regressions were excluded where Ramsey RESET specification tests are rejected (i.e. the joint significance of these polynomials). Where we had multiple setups per response variable, we selected the one with the best model fit (i.e. via AIC, BIC, log-likelihood, and the 'raw R 2 '). xxxviii As carb is significant at 90%-confidence we include it in the remaining discussion. xxxix To provide a numerical example, the effect of increasing index`p' by 10 basis points (e.g. from 0.4 to 0.5) is to reduce the expected number of energy efficiency competences by 0.554*0.260 0.10 = 0.4842, corresponding to a 1 -0.4842 = -51.58% decrease. xl As the coefficients have a multiplicative interpretation, the impact at the average grid-level (10.01) would amount to: 0.554 * 0.260 0.10 * (0.960 0.10 ) 10.01 = 0.4648, or a larger decrease of -53.52%. xli Regarding the previous footnote: we applied page 690 of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) , so that the incidence rate ratio for two NRAs with covariate values x i and x i ' along with an interaction term β 3 x i y i will be: exp(β 1 )exp(β 2 x i )exp(β 3 x i y i )exp(β 4 y i ) / exp(β 1 )exp(β 2 x i ')exp(β 3 x i 'y i )exp(β 4 y i ) = exp(β 2 (x i -x i '))exp(β 3 (x i -x i ')y i ). Here the covariate increase (xi-xi') equals 0.1, and y i equals 10.01.
For this calculus, we applied page 701 of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) , so that the incidence rate ratio with covariate values x i and x i ' will now be: exp(β 1 )exp(ψ 11 /2)exp(β 2 x i )exp{(β 3 +ψ 31 +y i ψ 33 /2)x i y i }exp{(β 4 +ψ 31 +y i ψ 33 /2)y i } / exp(β 1 )exp(ψ 11 /2)exp(β 2 x i ')exp{(β 3 +ψ 31 +y i ψ 33 /2)x i 'y i }exp{(β 4 +ψ 31 +y i ψ 33 /2)y i } = exp(β 2 (x i -x i '))exp{(β 3 +ψ 31 +y i ψ 33 /2)(x i -x i ')y i } where ψ 11 and ψ 33 is the variance of the random intercept and coefficient, respectively, and ψ 31 is the covariance of the random intercept with the random coefficient. xlii Random intercepts are not affected by covariate changes, so that the previous numerical example cannot be applied. If the competence-specific intercept of consumer protection (mkst) changes from zero to one standard deviation (0.2626 = 0.069 0.5 ) by shifting to another competence, the ceteris paribus effect will be 0.570 0.2626 (where 0.570 is the fixed intercept). xliii Building on the previous numerical examples, the expected index`p' effect can be obtained by further raising the interaction coefficient (0.960 0.10 ) 10.01 to the power of [cov(grid,cons) + ½ grid*var(grid)] = -0.029 + ½(10.01)0.001 = -0,024, resulting in a total decrease of -51.53%. xliv Another reason may result from the ICER 2011 and 2012 survey categories of "renewables and environment" and "environmental regulation" for the electricity and gas sectors, respectively. There is a possibility that these competences relate to more than the carbon-attributes of electricity and gas. xlv For example, among the European Commission's 20-20-20 targets (i.e. 20% reductions on carbon emissions, renewables, and energy efficiency), the targets on energy efficiency are not binding at Member State level.
